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Shift work has a documented negative impact on workers’ health and social life, 
effects which are compensated for with higher wages and shorter working hours. 
Many countries face a ‘nursing shortage’, and increasing wages is argued to lead to an 
increase in the short-term labor supply in health care. Omitting shift work in the 
evaluation of such policies may lead to biased estimates of the wage elasticities. 
Focusing on registered nurses (RN) employed in the public health sector, this paper 
presents an econometric analysis that allows the nurses to compose their ‘job 
package’ in three steps by choosing: a) hospital or primary care, b) daytime or shift 
work and c) one of four categories of hours. The utility maximization problem is 
solved by discretizing the budget set and choosing the optimal job package from a 
finite set of alternatives. The nested structure is estimated on Norwegian micro data. 
There is some variation in the responsiveness to wage between shift and day workers 
and by care level. The job-specific elasticities are small but positive. However, the 
simulation of a wage increase in all job types, when conditioning the analysis to those 
already participating in the sector, indicates a slight reduction in hours. Thus, the 




Shift work, in particular night work, is known to have a negative impact on the health 
and well-being of workers. Yet it is impossible to deliver inpatient health services 
without shift work. One segment of the literature addressing shortages of health 
personnel focuses on the wage impact on labor supply. Intuitively there is reason to 
believe that shift workers respond differently to a wage increase than those working 
daytime hours. For instance it probably causes more health strain to extend the 
working hours, from part-time to full-time, if you have to work the additional hours 
during nighttime.  
 
In addition, there is reason to believe that an increase in wages for both shift and 
daytime jobs might lead some workers to turn down the shift work compensation, as 
the daytime job pays ‘sufficiently’. This may increase the hours of work, as daytime 
hours are slightly longer, but at the expense of the willingness to work shift hours. A 
change in the relative wages of shift work and daytime hours will presumably have 
stronger effects. A very small number of existing studies take these differences 
between shift labor and regular daytime labor into account. This paper is an attempt to 
explicitly include the choice between shift work and daytime hours in a labor supply 
model of registered nurses (RNs), focusing on wage as a policy instrument. The 
nurses maximize utility given a nonlinear budget set that incorporates taxes in a static 
neo-classical structural labor supply model. The  approach is inspired by Aaberge, 
Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and van Soest (1995).  
 
The physical strain of shift work is well documented. An overview by Costa (1996) 
reports that shift work, particularly night work, can disturb cardiac rhythms, interfere 
with work performance and efficiency over 24 hrs, strain family and social 
relationships and impair sleeping and eating habits. Costa especially stresses that 
“Shift and night work may have specific adverse effects on women’s health in relation 
to family roles and hormonal and reproductive functions.” Ohida et.al (2001), in a 
study of young female nurses in Japan, observe a significant association between 
working night shifts and using alcohol to help induce sleep, and between shift work 
and daytime drowsiness. 
 
To compensate for the extra strain, shift workers often work shorter hours than those 
with a regular schedule. Partly because the agreed weekly hours are lower for shift 
workers, and partly because shift workers often prefer less than a full-time job to be 
able to look after their children and maintain their social life. This leads us to the 
positive aspects of shift work. Many workers prefer shift work in order to better cope 
with challenges outside the workplace, without leaving the work force. Many shift 
workers know that they will return to daytime hours later in life, but given their 
current situation shift work is preferred.  
 
In the literature review by Antonazzo et.al. (2003) of nurses’ labor supply, they 
emphasize the need to address the relative importance of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
job characteristics. “E.g. compensation for shift work is crucial for the nurses’ 
income, but shift work is reported as demanding, especially if you are in a full-time 
job.” However, the existing literature does not identify separate wage responses on 
working hours for personnel working shift hours and daytime hours respectively. The 
result might be an omitted variables bias in the estimated wage elasticities. One 
exception is a recent paper by Askildsen et al. (2003) who corrects for this effect. 4 
They stress the fact that several studies may be alleged to suffer from an omitted 
variables problem as they do not control for crucial differences in contractual 
arrangements between jobs. Shift hours are compensated for with an hourly wage 
premium, and with shorter mandated weekly working hours. Rosen (1986) gives an 
introduction to the literature on compensating variations. Applications on shift work 
include Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al. (2002).   
 
Shift work is, however, only one important factor when choosing a nursing job. In this 
paper the nurses first have to choose the preferred care level. There are many 
differences between a hospital and a primary care job, supporting the nested structure 
of the choice model, such as patient characteristics, types of nursing tasks, preventive 
versus curative focus, teamwork opportunities, stress levels, leadership, travel 
distance and centrality (hospitals are located in higher populated areas). Most of these 
characteristics are, however, unobservable to the researcher. International studies of 
the nursing labor market have noted large earnings differences between similar 
hospital and non-hospital RNs. Schumacher and Hirsch (1997) explain half of the 
hospital wage advantage in their study to be unmeasured worker ability. The 
remainder is likely to reflect compensating differentials for hospital disamenities. Due 
to the centralized wage bargaining for public employees, wage differences between 
care levels are more moderate in Norway.  
 
In their review of nursing labor supply, Antonazzo et.al. (2003), find a huge variation 
in results, particularly on the effect of wages, depending on the methodological 
framework applied. The impact of own wage on labor force participation is not 
significantly different from zero in most of the studies, whereas there are a few 
studies with elasticities greater than one. The impact on hours worked is estimated 
with elasticities from –0.94 to +2.8 depending on sample, time period and gender. The 
impact of an increase in household non-labor income is estimated with elasticities that 
are slightly negative in relation to the participation rate, and insignificant or negative 
for hours worked. An exception is Phillips (1995), which finds participation to be 
highly responsive to wage. The abovementioned study by Askildsen et al. (2003) 
estimates a wage elasticity from –0.05 to 0.46 depending on the econometric 
specification when regressing hours against the log wage. They argue that the 
alternative with an elasticity of 0.21 seems most reasonable due to their correction for 
sample selection and wage endogeneity. They find that individual and institutional 
features are statistically significant and important for working hours.  
 
Askildsen et al. is a natural reference point as their analysis uses some of the data 
registers used in my study. The approaches are, however, significantly different in 
some respects, making similar results less likely. Their sample includes both married 
and single females. They do not include non-work income, including spouse’s 
income. The taxes on labor income is also not included. In my study I focus on the 
single individuals who are expected to be more flexible in their response to wage 
changes. Taxes and non-work income like asset income and child allowance are 
included in this analysis. Askildsen et al. includes shift work in their analysis, but 
only as a measure to correct for the differences in wage rates for those working shifts. 
In my study, the alternatives of shift work or regular daytime work are presented as 
separate job packages with different hourly wages. The impact of other non-pecuniary 
aspects of shift work, like night work, on individual welfare is captured by the error 
term. Thus while Askildsen et.al. only focus on how wages should be corrected for 5 
the fact that wages in shift work are higher than in non-shift work, I account explicitly 
for the same fact, but also for the fact that changes in wages may have an effect on job 
choices. Other variables than wages may also affect the choices of shift work versus 
non-shift work.  
 
Sæther (2004) focuses on the prospects of attracting nurses to the public health sector 
from non-health jobs. That paper also applies a discrete choice framework and 
identifies a wage elasticity for hospital jobs of 0.17, and of 0.39 in primary care. Here, 
in the present paper I attempt to explicitly include the shift dimension into the model. 
The cost of this approach is the need to focus only on the subsamples of nurses 
working in the public sector. On the other hand, when we no longer need to identify 
the wages in non-health jobs, we can utilize the richness of the high quality register 
data for health personnel containing wages and hours in addition to the shift 
information.  
 
In this paper the nurses face three subsequent choices. First, the choice of care level, a 
hospital job or a primary care job like in a nursing home, home nursing or a health 
center. Secondly the choice of working shifts or regular daytime, and finally the 
choice of working hours. The motivation for this modeling is to better inform 
policymakers of the possible impact of wage as an instrument, focusing on making the 
predicted effect on all public health hours more accurate and on possible differences 
between personnel working shifts and regular hours.  
 
A comparison of the predictions of the model to the observed choices is encouraging. 
Both with regards to the choices between a hospital or a primary care job, and the 
choice between shift work and a regular daytime job. The predicted distribution of 
hours seems less accurate. The main difficulty is for the model to predict the high 
share working full-time without extra hours. 
 
The prediction of choices is repeated for policy simulations where the wages in some 
or all of the job alternatives are increased. Conditioning on participation in the public 
health care sector, I first present the effects of job type-specific wage increases. A 
10% increase in hospital pre-tax wages increases the predicted share choosing a 
hospital job with 3.4%. The short-term labor supply, measured in hours, is estimated 
to have an elasticity of 0.20 in the hospital jobs, but the high level of uncertainty 
makes it not significant from zero at a 10% level. The wage elasticity for primary care 
hours is higher, and significant at a 10% level. A simulation of a 10% increase in 
wages in all shift jobs, both hospital and primary care jobs, predicts an increase in the 
share preferring shift work with 2.9%. The wage elasticity for shift hours is 0.153. 
The wage elasticity for daytime hours is higher, but with great uncertainty in the 
predictions. 
 
A simulation of a wage increase in all job types predicts a somewhat different 
response. A 10% increase in the pre-tax hourly wages for those already employed in 
the public health sector is predicted to lead to a 1.43% decrease in hours worked. The 
predicted reduction is mainly an effect of more nurses preferring part-time and 
extended part-time work. There is little predicted change from daytime to shift work 
with shorter contracted hours, nor any systematic change between the care levels. 
When wages in all jobs are increased, the model predicts a slight reduction in hospital 
hours, and even more for primary care hours. The response in primary care hours is 6 
however not significantly different from zero. In response to a wage increase in all job 
types the shift hours are slightly reduced but the effect is not significantly different 
from zero. There is no significant difference in the response between shift and non-
shift hours.  
 
The complicated structure of the choices and the many factors in addition to wage 
influencing the choice of job type and hours are among the factors causing a relatively 
high level of uncertainty in the predictions. Keeping in mind that the analysis is 
restricted to the short-term impact on working hours of those already participating in 
the public health care sector, the lesson is that changes in wage has a limited impact 
on the working hours. A job-specific wage increase attracts nurses from other jobs 
and thus increases the hours produced in that job. The costs seem to be a slight 
reduction in the average hours of work for those enrolled prior to the wage increase.  
 
An overall wage increase for all public employees seems to reduce the hours of work 
slightly for those already employed. On the other hand we know from other studies, 
like Sæther (2004), that such wage increases will attract nurses from other sectors in 
the economy leading to a modest increase in the hours worked.   
 
The next section introduces the data and context, before a formal model is presented 
in Section 3. After a description of findings in Section 4, Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Data  
The public health care providers are the dominant employers for Norwegian 
registered nurses. In 2002, 91.4 percent of those working within health and social 
services were public employees. This paper is based on data from the Norwegian 
Association of Local and Regional Authorities (NALRA), organizing employers in 
municipalities and counties. The employers organized in NALRA employed almost 
all public staff, with the exception of some national hospitals. Being prior to the 
hospital ownership reform, the counties demanded RNs for their hospitals, and the 
municipalities needed personnel for their health centers, nursing homes and home 
nursing.  
 
In 2002, there were 77,819 registered nurses, of which 90% participated in the labor 
market. Those not participating were undertaking further education or enrolled in one 
of the social security programs, such as disability pension, medical and vocational 
rehabilitation and early retirement. For a general overview of the Norwegian health 
care system, see van den Noord et.al. (1998) and European Observatory on Health 
Care Systems (2000).  
 
The attractiveness of limiting the analysis to the NALRA employees is the superiority 
of the data quality. Each individual has a record of monthly working hours and pay in 
October. The income is separable into the basic salary and a fixed monthly benefit 
component including compensation for shift work. In addition, there is a separate 
component for overtime pay. Shift work is regulated by law and through agreements 
between NALRA and the nursing union. A registered nurse works 37.5 hours per 
week in a full-time position with daytime hours. Selecting a job that includes shift 
work will reduce this to 35.5 hours per week. Part-time work is common and 
expressed as a percentage of full-time. The character of the shift work varies, from a 7 
combination of daytime and evenings, to a combination of days, evenings and nights. 
Weekend work every third or fourth week is also common. Due to aggregation of the 
different compensation payments, I am unable to separate between the different shift 
forms. Each shift type has characteristics, however, that may be difficult to rank. As 
summarized by ICN (2000), evening and night shifts are frequently less staffed, and 
nurses have difficult access to safe transport and basic comforts such as hot meals. 
Rotating shifts have been associated with more sleep disturbance, digestive problems, 
fatigue and alcohol intake, as well as impaired psychological health and work 
performance. Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al. (2002) apply a similar shift 
measure.  
 
The sample is restricted to single females including cohabitants without joint children. 
The number of observations is 4042 in 1995 and 8124 in 2000. The most preferred 
alternative by far is a hospital job with shift work, followed by a primary care job 
with shift work. The general tendency is that RNs prefer shift work earlier in life, 
switching to daytime work as they get older.  
 
The data set is based on the NALRA data matched with other administrative data 
registers delivered by Statistics Norway. The set includes information about 
demography, income and employment relations and the age of children. Appendix 1 
provides details on the variable construction, trimming procedure and summary 
statistics for key individual level variables by job category. 
  
Hourly wage is the applied earnings measure, calculated by dividing monthly earnings 
by reported monthly hours. These observed hourly wages are used when assigning 
predicted hourly wages for all nurses in all possible job alternatives in the model, and 
not only the alternative actually chosen. The alternatives available for NALRA 
workers are hospital jobs with shift work, hospital jobs with daytime hours, primary 
care jobs with shift work and primary care jobs with daytime hours. I exploit the 
richness of the register data in this procedure, including residency and observed 
experience. When estimating the wage equation I control for the selection effect 
applying a Heckman two-step procedure, as there is reason to believe that there is a 
selection process driving the decision of where to work. See Appendix 2 for the 
wages, and Appendix 3 for the taxes.  
 
 
3.  Model   
This paper presents a static neo-classical structural labor supply model with single 
decision-makers. The individual’s utility depends on income, leisure and other 
characteristics of the jobs. The utility maximization problem is solved by discretizing 
the budget set and choosing the optimal care level, shift type, leisure and income 
combination from a finite set of alternatives. 
 
Conditioning on their participation in the public health care sector, nurses are facing a 
chain of choices in the composition of their “job package”. Firstly a choice between a 
hospital or primary care job (i =A, B), secondly whether to work shifts or regular 
daytime (j =1, 2), and finally the choice of category of hours  ijk h (k=1,…,4). Nurses 
working shifts face different contractual arrangements than those working daytime. 
Hours are shorter and the hourly wage is higher. The feasible working hours are 
grouped into the following categories: part-time, extended part-time, full-time, and 8 
extended full-time. Extended full-time is a nurse in full-time position working 
overtime, but also includes nurses working at more than one hospital where the total 
workload totals more than 100%. The hours per week in the categories are hi1k ={18.4, 
27.5, 35.5, 38.8} if the nurse works shifts, and hi2k ={19.6, 29.6, 37.5, 40.8} if the 
nurse works non-shift. Each ‘job package’ has a pre-tax wage rate per hour 
() ij ijk wh defined by the level of care i and shift type j. The offered wage is a piecewise 
linear relation of hours capturing the agreed terms in overtime compensation. In 
addition there are other job characteristics (i, j) that may affect preferences and hence 
choices. As an example we may think of specific skills involved in the job, patient 
mix and responsibility.   
 
Let Cijk be disposable household income after tax per year when the nurse works hijk 
hours in the main job i with shift category j with a wage per hour of wij (hijk). Hourly 
wage being dependent on hours worked is relevant only for those working extended 
overtime when they are compensated for overtime work. 
 
The pre-tax labor income  ijk r with job specific hours  ijk h is given by 
 
() ijk ij ijk ijk rw h h =               (1) 
 
Disposable income corresponding to the job package i,j,k is given by the budget 
constraint 
 
() ijk ijk ijk Cr T rI =− +             (2) 
 
The net-of-tax income Cijk is the sum of the after tax earnings in the job,  () ijk ijk rT r − , 
and other income, I, summarizing capital income after tax, transfers and savings. The 
tax, T(rijk), is progressive with the tax brackets in the Norwegian tax system.  
 
I assume that the nurses make their choices by maximizing utility, given the job-
packages available in the market. Thus, 
 
ijk (,, ) max , , ,
ijk




(, , , ) . ijk ijk hwi j D ∈                (4) 
 
The first element in the utility function represents the net-of-tax income. The second 
element is the leisure time represented with the sum of hours worked. The last 
elements are representations of other characteristics of the job packages i,j.  
 
The set D is the opportunity set, i.e. it contains all the opportunities available to the 
individual. I do not include non-market opportunities in D, and I have also excluded 
jobs not covered by the NALRA register. Note that for the same nurse, wage rates 
may differ across jobs and whether they work regular hours or not. In traditional labor 
supply offered wages are determined by human capital characteristics, and offered 9 
hours are uniformly distributed. However, in real life wages may vary across sectors 
for observationally identically workers, and jobs with a specific number of hours may 
be more available in the market than other, say “full-time”, jobs. Thus, when the 
nurses make their choice with respect to labor supply, they choose between job-
packages with different wage and hours profiles. See Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm 
(1999) for the modeling of labor supply along these lines. 
 
The preferences are unknown to the analyst, neither does he observe all details of the 
job-packages available in the market. I will therefore assume a random utility model  
 
Uijk=uijk+εijk,                (5) 
  
where Uijk is the utility when the nurse works hijk hours for employer i with shift j. uijk 
is the deterministic element in the utility function and εijk is a stochastic term with an 
iid extreme value distribution with an expected mean of 0 and a variance of 
22
2 /6 µπ . 
The random term εijk captures the unobserved attributes of the ‘job packages’. 
 
Let  () ijk ijk Ph  be the unconditional probability that hijk  hours are worked in job i with 
shift type j. 
 
{} ,, ()P r ( m a x ) ijk ijk ijk qsr qsr D Ph U U
∈ ==           (6) 
 
However, to explain the choice structure, I will start with the two last elements in the 
choice chain and work backwards. The choice of shifts or daytime and the choice of 
working hours, can be integrated into one expression. Let  Ajk h be the number of 
working hours k (k=1,2,3,4), in shift type j (j=1,2), when the nurse works at care level 





























,  j=1,2, k=1,2,3,4    (7) 
 
where the η -function is an opportunity index as the employers have a higher supply 





τ µ η =                                        (8) 
 
where 1 j s =  if the job is based on shift work and  0 j s =  if not.  τ  is a parameter.  
 
The expected consumer surplus is given by (Ben-Akviva and Lerman, 1985). For 
those preferring a hospital job we have  
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where A1 represents shift work at the hospital and A2 represents daytime work. The 
parallel expression for primary care as the first choice is 
 
12 22 () / () /
21 12 2
12
() l n () ()
Bk Bk uh uh
kB kB




=+   ∑∑                  (10) 
 
2 µ is not identified and is thus absorbed in the utility function. Following Ben-Akiva 
and Lerman (1985) it can be shown that in this case we get the following expression 
















       (11) 
 
where  21 / µ µµ =  is possible to identify.  1 µ takes care of the uncertainty in the choice 
between a hospital and a primary care job. µ is a measure of degree of dependence in 
unobserved utility among the alternatives in the upper nest. The statistic 1-
2 µ  is a 
measure used as an indication of correlation, in the sense that as µ  rises, indicating 
less correlation, this statistics drops. (McFadden, 1978). A value of µ =1 indicates 
complete independence within the nests, i.e. no correlation. When µ =1, representing 
independence among the alternatives, the GEV distribution becomes the product of 
independent extreme value terms. In this case the nested logit model reduces to the 
standard logit model. The value of µ  must be within a particular range for the model 
to be consistent with the utility-maximizing behavior. If µ  is between zero and one, 
the model is consistent with utility maximization for all possible values of the 
explanatory variables. (Train, 2003).    
 
I have also introduce an opportunity index related to location  ( ) d δ . While there are 
primary care jobs for nurses in all municipalities in the country, the availability of 
hospital jobs is scarce in less urban areas. To correct for these differences in the 
opportunity sets, an indicator of centrality is applied. d=1 if the nurse lives in an 




θ δ =                              (12) 
 
with θ  as an unknown parameter.  
 
The probability of choosing a primary care job is P(B)=1-P(A). The unconditioned 
probabilities are thus  
 
(, ) (| ) ( ) Ajk Ajk Ph A Ph APA = ;  j=1,2 , k=1,2,3,4                   (13) 
 
( ,) ( |)() Bjk Bjk Ph B Ph BPB = ;  j=1,2 , k=1,2,3,4                   (14) 
 
The likelihood function is then  
 11 
(, ) (, ) s ijk s ijk
sA sB
LP h A P h B
∈∈
=∏∏                         (15) 
 
Economic theory does not impose the functional form of the utility function. Van 
Soest (1995) prefers a polynominal representation of the utility function. Aaberge 
et.al. prefer the ‘Box-Cox’ function. This structural form of the utility function gives 
an opportunity to interpret the parameters as opposed to a polynomial representation 
of the utility function. An implication of the MaCurdy et al. (1990) critique is that 
seemingly flexible functional forms may not be flexible anymore once quasi-
concavity or monotonicity is imposed. Even though we do not impose these 
conditions explicitly, it might still be the case that the structure of the model 
implicitly will force the estimates to satisfy quasi-concavity. For example, a wrongly 
shaped utility function would lead to high probabilities of choosing the corners of the 
budget frontier. The focus on single females reduces the numbers of unobserved 
complicating factors in the behavioral responses, making facing such complications 
less likely. The alternative of applying a polynomial to estimate the utility function 
non-parametrically may give a better fit but is less grounded in economic theory.  
 
The deterministic part of the preferences in this paper is thus represented by a 
variation of a “Box-Cox” utility function. Quasi-concavity is not imposed, but 
checked ex post to confirm that the estimated preferences are quasi-concave. I let 
2 / Ajk Ajk vu µ = , and  2 / Bjk Bjk vu µ = .  
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  =+ − ⋅ −                  (16) 
where  
 
01 12 2 () jj X XX β ββ β =+ +                          (17) 
 
8760 is the number of total annual hours, while α , λ , and the  s β′  are unknown 
parameters. For the utility function to be quasi-concave, we require λ <1. Note that if 
0 λ →  the utility function converges to a log-linear function. The characteristics are: 
X1= age of the nurse, X2=1, if shift work, = 0 if daytime work. The parameters (α, λ, 
β0j, β1, β2j,τ ,µ ,θ ) are estimated using a maximum-likelihood procedure. Note that 
µ2  is not identified, and is absorbed in α and βj.   
 
 
4.  Results 
Before focusing on the policy simulation making it possible to calculate wage 
elasticities, the parameters estimated are presented and a comparison is made of the 
choices predicted with those observed. 
 
From Table 1 we observe that all parameters are sharply determined and that λ  is 
estimated to yield a quasi-concave utility function. Parameters attached to the income 
term in the utility function (16) are estimated with a λ  of –1.68 and an α  - the 
constant in the consumption term - of 0.84, meaning that the nurses prefer the job that 
pays best if otherwise similar. In the leisure component, the constant  0 β in the leisure 12 
term is positive and significant, which means that more hours of leisure increases the 
utility. Somewhat surprisingly  1 β  is negative, as one might expect that the nurses 
would prefer jobs with less working hours when they get older. This may be caused 
by the fact that some of the young nurses have small children and therefore choose 
part-time jobs. As expected personnel working shifts prefers jobs with shorter 
working hours. Their additional hour of work is much more likely to be at nighttime, 
making it more demanding than extending the working hours during daytime. The 
effect seems to be slightly stronger for hospital personnel, with a  2A β of 10.20 and a 
2B β  of 7.93. µ , the degree of independence in unobserved utility among the upper 
nests, is estimated to 0.71. Remember however, that this parameter is weighted by the 
centrality of residency, τ . The parameter θ  in the opportunity index, taking into 
account the dominating offer of shift jobs, is also significant with a value of 1.27. 
McFadden’s Rho is reported to 0.175.  
 
 
Table 1 Estimation of parameters of the utility function and opportunity densities.  
    
    EstimateStd.error P-value 
     
  Utility function   
0 β   Constant - ’leisure element’  
5.651 1.358[.000] 
1 β   Age 
-0.118 0.031[.000] 
2A β  Shift Work in hospitals 
10.200 0.890[.000] 
2B β  Shift Work in primary care 
7.926 0.941[.000] 
     
α   Constant - ‘consumption element’  0.836 0.212[.000] 
λ   Exponent - ‘consumption element’  -1.677 0.231[.000] 
     
µ   Degree of independence in unobserved utility among the alternatives 0.709 0.266[.008] 
     
  Opportunity density*   
τ   1 if living in a central area, 0 otherwise  1.150 0.067[.000] 
θ   1 if the job is shift work, 0 otherwise  1.274 0.046[.000] 
       
Number of observations  4042  
Log likelihood  -9243.97  
McFadden's Rho  0.175  
For the wage equation see appendix 2. 
 
 
How well does the model predict? 
A comparison of the predictions of the model with the observed choices is 
encouraging, both with regard to the choice between a hospital and a primary care job 
and the choice of shift type. As reported in Table 2, 71.7% are predicted to choose a 
hospital job, while 73.1% are observed working at a hospital. 81.9% are predicted to 
work shifts, while 82.1% are observed with such arrangements. The predicted 
distribution of hours seems less accurate. The main difficulty is for the model to 
predict the high share working full-time without extra hours. Aggregating the 
probabilities for part-time and full-time jobs respectively gives a prediction of 45% 13 
(35% observed) working part-time and 65% (55% observed) working full-time. A 
common approach is to introduce an opportunity index to model the fact that the 
availability of jobs is peaked around certain categories of hours. This is not a feasible 
strategy here as the number of alternative hours is limited to four in this model due to 
the complicated nested structure leading to 16 possible alternatives of choice 
combinations.  
 
58.7% are predicted to work in a hospital job with shift work (61.3% observed), 13% 
in a hospital job without shift work (11.8% observed), 23.3% in a primary care job 
with shift work (20.8% observed) and 5.0% in primary care without shift work (6.1% 
observed). The predicted average of total weekly hours is 31.9 (32.1 hours per week 
observed). If we let the “average nurse” represent the distribution of total working 
hours, that is 31.9 hours per week, 18.7 hours (19.9 hours observed) will be worked in 
a hospital job with shift work and 4.1 hours (3.9 hours observed) with regular 
daytime. 7.5 hours (6.2 hours observed) will be worked in a primary care job with 
shifts and 1.6 hours (2.1 hours observed) with regular daytime work. 
 
Out-of-sample prediction 
From a policy perspective an important feature of structural modeling is the ability to 
present relevant out-of-sample predictions. To evaluate the model I use the parameters 
estimated from the 1995 data and predict the choices in 2000. The sample is now all 
the 8124 single females in 2000, still including cohabitants without joint children. The 
hourly wages are predicted from the observed data in 2000. There were changes in the 
average relative wages after 1995 making shift work better compensated in 2000. In 
addition, the wage growth was higher in the hospital sector making the average hourly 
wage identical between the care levels in 2000. Daytime work wages were, however, 
12% lower in the hospital sector and 18% lower in the primary care sector. In a 
situation with excess demand for nursing labor there is reason to expect that nurses 
respond to the relative wage changes with a higher share preferring jobs in the 
hospital sector, and jobs with shift work.  
 
There were, however, extensive changes during this 6-year period both in institutional 
features, like the introduction of a new financing system for hospitals, and a 
significant increase in the number of nurses employed in the public sector. This 
increase was matched by a rise in production levels, though not proportionally with 
the increase in personnel. In specialist health services, the psychiatric and somatic 
institutions increased the number of full-time nursing positions by 23% to 27,415 in 
2000 (Statistics Norway, 2001). The number of full-time positions increased in 
primary care too; 30% for all professions. In the samples included here the share 
working in primary care was 27% in 1995 and 38% in 2000. These changes in sample 
shares can partly be due to an increase in the number of primary care institutions 
reporting to the NALRA register. With such extensive changes in the health sector, it 
is probably to push our luck to expect accurate predictions of a model based on cross 
section parameters in 1995.  
 
In the right column in Table 3, the observed and predicted choices are presented for 
the nurses observed in 2000. The average age is 34.5, the same as for the sample from 
1995 presented in Table 2. We see that 73.3% are predicted to chose a hospital job 
(61.7% observed). The model is thus responding to the relative increase in the 
hospital wages since 1995 and predicts an increase in this share. 82.4% are predicted 14 
to work shifts, which also is an expected increase due to the relative increase in shift 
wages. The observed choices indicate, however, a slight reduction in the share to 
80.7%.  
 
As above the model has difficulties in predicting the high share working full-time. 
The model predicts a reduction in the full-time hours from 55% to 50%. While the 
level is too low, the direction of change is correct with an observed share of 60% 
working full-time in 2000 compared to 65% in 1995.  15 
 
Table 2. Observed and predicted choices in 1995. 
 Observed Predicted 






Hospital 0.731   0.717 0.116
Primary 0.269     0.283 0.116
 1.000   1.000 
         
Shift 0.821   0.819 0.034
Daytime 0.179     0.181 0.034
 1.000   1.000 
          





Part-time 0.157   0.169 0.124
Extended part-time  0.189   0.277 0.035
Full-time 0.508   0.295 0.056
Extended full-time  0.147    0.259 0.087
 1.000   1.000 





Shift – hospital  0.613  0.587 0.102
Daytime – hospital  0.118   0.130 0.032
Shift – primary  0.208   0.233 0.094
Daytime –primary  0.061    0.050 0.026
 1.000   1.000 






Hours – hospital shift  19.9 16.6 18.7 3.5
Hours – hospital daytime  3.9 11.1 4.1 1.3
Hours – primary shift  6.2 12.5 7.5 3.1
Hours - primary daytime  2.1 8.5   1.6 1.0
 32.1 6.9  31.9 2.6
  
Age 34.5 8.6 
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Table 3. Out-of-sample predictions. Observed and predicted choices in 2000.  
   Observed in 1995 and 2000    Observed in 2000    
                                
   Observed Predicted  Observed Predicted 
      MeansStd.dev. MeansStd.dev.  MeansStd.dev. MeansStd.dev.
    
  
Job-type







Hospital   0.579   0.731 0.118 0.617 0.733 0.114
Primary     0.421    0.269 0.118  0.383   0.267 0.114
   1.000   1.000  1.000  1.000 
                   
Shift   0.752   0.820 0.030 0.807 0.824 0.026
Daytime     0.248    0.180 0.030  0.193   0.176 0.026
   1.000   1.000  1.000  1.000 
                 
Hours of work   
Category







Part-time   0.178   0.213 0.110 0.175 0.193 0.100
Extended part-time   0.261   0.277 0.033 0.228   0.285 0.031
Full-time   0.458   0.271 0.047 0.503 0.281 0.044
Extended full-time     0.102    0.239 0.084 0.093  0.241 0.072
   1.000   1.000  1.000  1.000 
               
  
Job-type







Shift – hospital    0.453   0.599 0.103 0.515 0.603 0.099
Daytime – hospital   0.126   0.132 0.026 0.102 0.131 0.025
Shift – primary    0.299   0.221 0.094 0.292 0.222 0.093
Daytime –primary     0.122    0.048 0.026 0.091  0.045 0.023
   1.000   1.000  1.000  1.000 












Shift – hospital    14.0 16.1 18.3 3.1 16.2 16.4 18.6 3.0
Daytime – hospital   4.4 11.9 4.0 1.1 3.6 10.8 4.0 1.0
Shift – primary    8.5 13.6 6.9 3.0 8.5 13.8 7.0 3.0
Daytime -primary     4.2 11.5   1.5 0.9 3.1 10.0 1.4 0.8
   31.2 7.1 30.8 2.3 31.4 7.0 31.0 2.0
           
Age   39.1 7.1     34.5 7.8   
Sample size    2605       8124    17 
 

















jobs   





care jobs  












  MeansStd.dev.  MeansStd.dev. MeansStd.dev.  MeansStd.dev.  MeansStd.dev.  MeansStd.dev. 
     
Probabilities     
Hospital  0.717 0.116 0.719 0.116 0.741 0.113 0.694 0.121  0.717 0.117 0.719 0.116
Primary  0.283 0.116 0.281 0.116 0.259 0.113 0.306 0.121  0.283 0.117 0.281 0.116
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
                         
Shift  0.819 0.034 0.82 0.032 0.819 0.034 0.82 0.036  0.843 0.038 0.792 0.035
Daytime  0.181 0.034 0.18 0.032 0.181 0.034 0.18 0.036  0.157 0.038 0.208 0.035
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
                         
Part-time  0.169 0.124 0.173 0.123 0.169 0.124 0.159 0.128 0.169 0.124 0.16 0.128
Extended part-time 0.277 0.035 0.279 0.034 0.277 0.035 0.273 0.035 0.276 0.034 0.274 0.035
Full-time  0.295 0.056 0.293 0.055 0.295 0.056 0.3 0.058 0.293 0.055 0.301 0.059
Extended full-time 0.259 0.087 0.254 0.084 0.259 0.087 0.268 0.09 0.262 0.087 0.264 0.089
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Hours                           
Hospital   22.8 4.1 22.5 4.0 23.2 4.0 22.0 4.1 22.5 4.0 22.8 4.0
Primary care  9.1 3.9 9.0 3.8 8.4 3.7 9.8 4.0 9.0 3.8 9.0 3.9
Shift jobs  26.2 2.2 25.8 2.0 25.9 2.0 26.1 2.2 26.6 2.3 25.3 1.8
Daytime jobs    5.8 1.7   5.7 1.5 5.7 1.6  5.7 1.7   5.0 1.6  6.6 1.7 
Hours total  31.9 2.6 31.5 2.4 31.6 2.5 31.8 2.6 31.6 2.5 31.8 2.6
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Table 5. Effects of policy simulations 
   A job specific simulated 10% wage increase in  




care jobs Shift jobs
Daytime 
jobs
         
Wage elasticities    Means Std.dev. Means Std.dev. Means Std.dev. Means Std.dev. Means Std.dev.
                   
All hours    -0.1427(**) 0.0740 -0.111(*) 0.061 -0.040 0.027 -0.1154(*) 0.0604 -0.0374 0.0206
                  
Hospital hours    -0.1218(**) 0.0659 0.200 0.182 -0.346 0.214 -0.1167 0.0619 -0.0110 0.0158
Primary hours    -0.2047 0.1433 -0.903 0.462 0.748(*) 0.382 -0.1192 0.0983 -0.1072 0.0682
                  
Shift hours    -0.1310 0.1249 -0.105 0.099 -0.034 0.040 0.1530(*) 0.0981 -0.3330 0.1618
Daytime hours    -0.1178 0.2362 -0.082 0.167 -0.042 0.091 -1.3662 0.6369 1.4387 0.8171
                  
Hospital shift hours                        -0.1089 0.0958 0.214 0.206 -0.346 0.214 0.1587(*) 0.0859 -0.3146(*) 0.1523
Hospital daytime hours    -0.0990 0.2733 0.223 0.330 -0.346 0.214 -1.3844 0.6429 1.4889 0.8560
Primary shift hours    -0.1955 0.2066 -0.903 0.462 0.757 0.379 0.1303 0.1459 -0.3804 0.1902
Primary daytime hours     -0.1704 0.1720 -0.903 0.462 0.791 0.524 -1.3209 0.6206 1.3055 0.7187
                  
Part–time hours     2.5051 1.6572 1.931 1.305 0.721 0.618 1.8497 1.2364 0.8670 0.5932
Extended part-time hours    0.3685 0.3120 0.277 0.231 0.113 0.122 0.2162 0.2119 0.1908 0.1305
Full-time hours    -0.2675 0.2107 -0.218 0.173 -0.064 0.062 -0.2780 0.1852 0.0003 0.0558
Extended full-time hours    -0.6514 0.3202 -0.499 0.261 -0.189 0.125 -0.3848 0.2044 -0.3336 0.1621
* indicates a result that is significantly different from zero at a 10% level, while ** is significant at a 5% level. 19 
A policy experiment 
In order to identify the wage elasticities, a policy experiment is introduced. We now 
look at desired hours only and not actual hours. The predictions presented above are 
repeated while increasing pre-tax wage rates and leaving the tax system unaffected. 
Table 4 presents the predicted choices before and after a job–specific wage increase or 
an increase in all wages simultaneously. Table 5 presents the matching elasticities, or 
sum of elasticities for wage increases in all job types. The elasticities are calculated by 
100 ( )/ *(100/10) www hhh − , where  0 w h  is predicted average weekly hours prior to the 
policy reform and  1 w h is the same expression afterwards. The elasticity is divided by 
10, as the policy simulation introduced a 10% wage increase. 
 
Job specific wage increases 
When targeting the simulated wage increases to the hospital jobs, the probability of 
selecting a hospital job is increased from 71.7% to 74.1%. The hospital hours are 
increased with an elasticity of 0.200, although not significantly at a 10% level. At the 
same time the sum of hours for both care levels is reduced. The predicted reduction in 
total hours is 1.1% for a 10% wage increase in the hospital jobs. An increase in 
primary care wages mirrors the changes predicted from an increase in hospital wages, 
but the magnitude is larger at 0.75. The next policy simulation is an increase in shift 
wages only. The wage elasticity for the shift hours is found to be 0.153. The 
elasticities were 0.158 for hospital shift hours and 0.130 for primary care shift jobs.  
 
General wage increases 
The second column in Table 4 shows a 10% increase in all wages. In a policy 
perspective this may be more realistic in a scenario with centralized wage bargaining 
like in Norway. The predicted change is a reduction in average hours worked per 
week to 31.5, a reduction of 1.5%. Annually this adds up to more than three working 
days lost per nurse due to the income effect of a wage increase. Of course the 
sensitivity of labor supply to the wage rate varies over the sample, but for the policy 
analysis we focus on the aggregated elasticities. As reported in Table 5 a 10% wage 
increase in all public sector jobs leads to a reduction of hours with 1.4%.  The 
predicted reduction is mainly an effect of more nurses preferring part-time and 
extended part-time. There is little predicted change between the care levels nor any 
systematic change from daytime to shift work with shorter contracted hours. The job-
specific changes due to a general pre-tax hourly wage increase is a reduction of 1.2% 
for hospital hours and a reduction of 2% for primary care hours. The corresponding 
reductions for shift hours are 1.3% and 1.1% for the daytime hours. Most of these 
predicted changes are not significantly different from zero, with the exception of all 
hours and the hospital hours (at a 5% level). This result is somewhat surprising as the 
sample consists of single females who are traditionally more responsive to changes in 




A discrete choice labor supply model incorporating self-selection and choice of shift 
work was developed and estimated on single female Norwegian registered nurses. 
Conditioning on their participation in the public health care sector, the nurses are 
facing a chain of choices in the composition of their “job package”. Firstly a choice 
between a hospital and a primary care job, secondly whether to work shifts or regular 20 
daytime and finally the choice of one of four categories of hours. A high share of the 
RNs work shifts, and thus face different contractual arrangements than those working 
daytime. The hours are shorter and the hourly wage is higher, but the health strain 
related to shift work is also well documented. The choices are predicted with the 
existing contractual arrangements and then repeated for policy simulations where the 
pre-tax wage rates in all or some of the job alternatives are altered.  
 
First, I increase wages for only one of the care levels or one of the shift types. A 
simulated increase in hospital wages predicts a wage elasticity of 0.20 for the hospital 
hours, however not significantly different from zero. This result is mirrored for a 
wage increase in the primary care sector, however with a larger and significant effect. 
A simulated wage increase for shift jobs predicts a wage elasticity of 0.15. This is 
mirrored by the daytime hours, but with a higher degree of uncertainty. One reason 
for the high level of uncertainty for the primary care and regular daytime hours is 
probably the fact that there are relatively few single nurses observed in these 
categories. The complicated structure of the choices and the large number of factors in 
addition to wage influencing the choice of job type and hours, are other reasons for 
the relatively high level of uncertainty in the predictions.  
 
The simulation of a 10% wage increase in all “job packages” predicts no or a slightly 
negative response in hours worked in the public health care sector. The predicted 
reduction is mainly an effect of more nurses preferring part-time and extended part–
time work. There is little predicted change between care levels, nor any systematic 
change from daytime to shift work, with shorter contracted hours. The response is 
somewhat stronger for primary care hours than for hospital hours, but the primary 
care response is also predicted with higher uncertainty. The shift hours respond to a 
simulated increase in wages in all job types with a slight reduction in hours offered, 
while the response in regular hours is somewhat lower. Neither of these responses in 
hours are significantly different from zero.  
 
It seems reasonable to assume that the increase in wage rates for all nurses might lead 
some people to renounce the shift work compensation, as the daytime job pays 
‘sufficiently’. The simulation of a wage increase in all jobs predicts no such 
reallocation. The reduction in hours is due to a change from full-time to part–time, but 
with a stable allocation of hours between care levels and shift types.   
 
Bearing in mind that the analysis is restricted to the short-term impact on working 
hours of those already participating in the public health care sector, the lesson is that 
changes in wage has a limited impact on working hours. To the extent that such 
changes are found, the effect seems to be slightly negative when measuring total 
hours offered. One way to interpret this result is that conditioned on the decision to 
participate in the work force there are other factors that are as least as important for 
the hours worked as wage. Intuitively there is reason to believe that shift workers 
respond differently to a wage increase than those working daytime hours. The 
predictions from the model presented in this paper weakly support such beliefs, but 
due to the high level of uncertainty in the model, the differences in wage elasticities 
are not significant.  
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As an instrument to reallocate hours between job packages, job-specific wage 
increases are effective, but incur a loss as the total number of hours worked is 
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Appendix 1. Variable construction and trimming procedure. 
 
The data used is based on several of the administrative data registers delivered by 
Statistics Norway, with the register of authorized health personnel as an identifier. 
Our trimming procedure excludes personnel above 66 years of age, as many retire at 
67. Some personnel categories have access to early retirement, but it was not common 
practice for registered nurses in 1995.  
 
Authorized foreign RNs are excluded when they do not have a permanent residency in 
Norway (only temporary residency code/social security number, F-number), or if they 
have a permanent residency code, but no income or address in Norway. The data 
includes information about annual earnings prior to and after taxation, employment 
status, and demographic variables. All employers are coded by the NACE Standard 
Industrial Classification, which gives us detailed information about their sector and 
type of activity.  
 
Table A1 Sample trimming 
 N 
  
RNs registered in 1995 (permanent residence code only)  63 527
   
Subtracting   
Foreigners with no income in Norway  3 934
RNs with higher education (Not nursing related)  658
67 years or older  2 387
Registered during 1995  2 722
Temporary licenses  40
Missing in some variables  2 335
Not employed by NALRA (Or working in a NALRA institution not reporting)  27 280
NALRA employees  24 171




Table A2 Key variables by sector 
1995     All   Hospital     
Primary 
care       
    Shift  Daytime   Shift   Daytime
  
 Variable     MeanSt.dev. MeanSt.dev. MeanSt.dev. MeanSt.dev. MeanSt.dev. 
                    
Sector share    100%  0.613 0.487 0.118 0.323 0.208 0.406 0.061 0.239
N   4042  2477  477  842   246 
                       
Age   34.5 8.6 33.4 7.6 40.7 10.7 33.5 8.3 37.3 8.9
Born in Norway=1    0.93 0.25 0.93 0.25     0.94 0.24 0.94 0.23
Gave birth in 1994 or 1995    0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.28 0.25 0.43 0.09 0.29
Live in a central area     0.66 0.71 0.74 0.48 0.56
(Cat. 6&7 out of 7)     
    
Income from work, NOK    205660 39756 207113 38088 210962 42531 195368 40218 215981 42358
Social security benefits, NOK    12 756 21181 10303 19109 15011 25677 18039 22470 15001 22880
Total income, NOK     221050 41868 219789 38433 229691 48778 215466 40048 236102 57974
                       
Hours per year                        
Part-time   0.16 0.36 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.08 0.27
Extended part-time    0.19 0.39 0.19 0.40 0.09 0.29 0.24 0.43 0.12 0.33
Full-time   0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.50  0.74 0.44
Extended full-time    0.15 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.35 0.05 0.22  0.06 0.23
                     
Predicted mean wage per hour, 
NOK 
Prior to shifts and other 
compensation payments*                     
Hospital – daytime     104.1 5.90 103.7 6.0 106.5 5.0 103.4 5.8  105.5 5.1
Hospital – shift work     96.1 5.52 95.6 5.6 98.9 4.7 95.6 5.2  98.2 4.7
Primary care – daytime    105.5 3.31 105.3 3.3 107.4 2.8 105.0 3.1  106.7 2.9
Primary care – shift work     103.7 3.58 103.4 3.6 105.5 3.1 103.2 3.4  105.1 3.1
                     
* The average hourly compensation is NOK 11.7 for hospital nurses working shifts and NOK 3.73 for daytime workers. For primary care 
nurses the compensation pay is NOK 16.4 per hour for those working shifts and NOK 5.9 for daytime workers.  
 
 
Appendix 2. Hourly wages by care level and shift type 
 
Job specific hourly wages are constructed for all the alternatives, including ‘job 
packages’ with a different care level and shift type than for their actual job. The first 
step is to sort the jobs by the NACE standard industrial classification and aggregate 
into two care levels. The job types are then categorized by shift type into two 
alternatives: Regular daytime or shift work compounding all other shift combinations. 
Only public positions within institutions organized by NALRA are included: A) 
Hospitals with and without shift work and B) primary care jobs with and without shift 
work.  
The earnings measure used is hourly wage. I have calculated hourly wages for the job 
in which they were  observed. This is possible due to detailed data of monthly income 
and working hours for the NALRA employees. Intuitively there is reason to believe 
that there is a selection into the different job types driven by unobserved factors such 
as preferences and productivity. I take this selection into consideration when 
predicting hourly wages for each individual, also in the job categories where they do 
not work. A Heckman two-step procedure is applied when estimating the wage 
equations as presented in Table A3, with a significant selection effect. I repeat this 25 
procedure for each job category. Table A3 only reports the wage equation for hospital 
jobs with regular daytime work. Only the basic salary is included in this regression. 
Compensation for management tasks and strenuous work is not included. I exclude 
the equations for the other job alternatives, as they are parallel. The wage prediction is 
undertaken for all NALRA employees, not only single ones. The wage rates are quite 
homogenous due to the centralized wage bargaining. The wage rate is mostly driven 
by work experience. I have used number of years with an income qualifying for 
pension entitlement during the last 20 years as a measure of experience. The measure 
is constructed on earnings histories available from the Norwegian National Insurance 
Scheme. A management position or additional specialization in a subdiscipline of 
nursing are possible ways to increase earnings. Some institutions in severe need of 
personnel offer a higher additional compensation and wage rates beyond the level 
agreed upon in the central bargaining for their number of years of work experience. 
The nurses’ age is important with regard to their choice of job type. A representative 
“work life cycle” is to start of with a full-time job with shift work. After the first 
maternity leave a part-time job is preferred. As the children grow older the hours of 
work are increased again. As the nurses grow older, there will gradually be a higher 
share that prefers daytime work only. The first job is normally in a central area where 
the colleges and hospitals are located, but with age many relocate to less central areas. 
Due to our subsample of single nurses the average age is only 34.5 years, and on 
average it is 9 years since they were licensed.    26 
Table A3. Wage equation  
   Heckman selection model  Coef. Std. Err z
   Dependent variable: Wage per hour in the hospital sector       
Female Female=1  -0.0430 0.0058 -7.35
Regiona Oslo/Akershus  0.0053 0.0112 0.47
Regionc West  -0.0019 0.0050 -0.38
Regiond Middle  0.0038 0.0057 0.67
Regione North  0.0929 0.0056 16.49
Age Age  0.0691 0.0555 1.25
age2 Age^2/10  -0.1711 0.1899 -0.90
age3 Age^3/1000  0.1686 0.2834 0.60
age4 Age^4/100000  -0.0529 0.1557 -0.34
erf95  Years of work experience  last 20 years  -0.0067 0.0144 -0.46
erf952 Experience^2/10  0.2275 0.2237 1.02
erf953 Experience^3/1000  -1.7856 1.3783 -1.30
erf954 Experience^4/100000  4.4604 2.9214 1.53
Cnordic  From Nordic country except Norway=1  -0.0026 0.0084 -0.31
coecd_no  From OECD area except the Nordic countries=1  0.0105 0.0109 0.96
Cglobal Non-OECD  background=1  -0.0303 0.0162 -1.87
kommsen1 Municipal  centrality  index 1 =1 – Least central  -0.0172 0.0077 -2.23
kommsen2  Municipal centrality index 2 =1   -0.0172 0.0070 -2.47
kommsen3  Municipal centrality index 3 =1   -0.0552 0.0052 -10.71
kommsen4  Municipal centrality index 4 =1   -0.0195 0.0150 -1.30
kommsen5  Municipal centrality index 5 =1   0.0085 0.0090 0.94
kommsen6  Municipal centrality index 6 =1  (7= Most central)  -0.0075 0.0049 -1.52
Constant     3.6941 0.5941 6.22
   select          
Female Female=1  -0.2191 0.0380 -5.77
Regiona Oslo/Akershus  -0.6368 0.0422 -15.09
Regionc West  0.0867 0.0359 2.42
Regiond Middle  0.0577 0.0405 1.43
Regione North  0.1038 0.0386 2.69
Cnordic  From Nordic country except Norway=1  -0.0218 0.0565 -0.39
coecd_no  From OECD area except the Nordic countries=1  -0.0932 0.0752 -1.24
Cglobal Non-OECD  background=1  -0.2286 0.0995 -2.30
Age Age  0.7607 0.3577 2.13
age2 Age^2/10  -2.5423 1.2481 -2.04
age3 Age^3/1000  3.9098 1.8884 2.07
age4 Age^4/100000  -2.2747 1.0473 -2.17
erf95  Years of work experience  last 20 years  -0.1937 0.0823 -2.35
erf952 Experience^2/10  3.3933 1.3208 2.57
erf953 Experience^3/1000  -21.3902 8.3671 -2.56
erf954 Experience^4/100000  47.4317 18.1047 2.62
married Married=1  0.0392 0.0233 1.68
b950_5  No. of children aged 0-5  -0.0596 0.0188 -3.17
kommsen1 Municipal  centrality  index 1 =1 – Least central  0.1356 0.0566 2.40
kommsen2  Municipal centrality index 2 =1   -0.0244 0.0507 -0.48
kommsen3  Municipal centrality index 3 =1   -0.0127 0.0377 -0.34
kommsen4  Municipal centrality index 4 =1   0.3051 0.1147 2.66
kommsen5  Municipal centrality index 5 =1   -0.0849 0.0639 -1.33
kommsen6  Municipal centrality index 6 =1  (7= Most central)  0.0802 0.0348 2.31
Constant     -9.6467 3.7106 -2.6027 
 
  Coef. Std. Err z
       
/athrho   0.085 0.202 0.42
/lnsigma   -2.440 .0177335 -137.60
      
rho   0.085 0.200 
sigma   0.087 0.002 
lambda   0.007 0.018  
 
Log likelihood  -5471.45
Number of obs   24171
Censored obs    20553
Uncensored obs  3618
Wald chi2(22)       865.6
Prob >chi2       0
 
 




Table A4 Tax rules applied  
Income = Y  Tax 
0 – 20 954  0 
20 954 – 143 500  0.302Y – 6 328 
143 500 – 212 000  0.358Y – 14 364 
212 000 – 239 000  0.453Y – 34 504 
239 000 -  0.495Y – 44 542 
 
Capital tax 
Capital income is taxed at a rate of 28 percent. 
 